THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIDCENTURY CORPORATION
STATUTES
WinBEx G. IKrz*
I
the Editor suggests a tempting
for
this
symposium,
Look"
tide
In the "New
figure of speech concerning fashions in corporation laws. He invites contributors
to examine the models now on display and to describe what it is that constitutes the
"new look." It might be entertaining to see how far one could spin out the fashionshow analogy. (One uninhibited commentator. has, indeed, suggested that the contours of the American Bar Association's Model Business Corporation Act make it a
My pen, however, is too heavy for such
seductive invitation to irresponsibility)
a task; and the Editor has used the term "philosophy" in defining my subject. What
is expected from me, I take it, is a discussion of contemporary theories concerning
the purposes of corporation statutes and the provisions appropriate for the accomplishment of those purposes. In trying to meet this assignment, it seems most
promising to look not for theories embodied in toto in particular statutes, but for
theories reflected in various statutes in different degrees and proportions.
Tle general purpose of incorporation statutes is to provide a particular legal
mode for the organization of business enterprise. If we are to try to be "philosophical," we must begin at the beginning; we must begin with the concept of
business enterprise and the function of the law of business organization. For our
purposes, analysis of the concept of enterprise discloses three elements: risk, control,
and profit. Problems of business organization are problems in the allocation of these
elements among the parties to the enterprise. The law of business organization
(agency, partnerships, corporations) is principally concerned with (i) defining the
area within which parties are free to allocate risk, control, and profit as they wish,
and (2) prescribing the allocation of these elements in the absence of express agreement.
I shall be interpreting the general problem of corporate legislation as a problem
in regulating the allocation of these elements of enterprise so as to promote responsi-

bility of investment and management. In the simplest type of business unit, the unincorporated one-man enterprise, no such problem arises. Risk, control, and profit
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are concentrated in the individual enterpriser. He operates under the general
rules of contracts, torts, and property-rules which are backed up by remedial law,
including the law against transfers in fraud of creditors. These rules, in effect, assign
to the enterpriser (as profit or loss) the consequences of his business decisions. Since
he thus takes the consequences, he has an incentive to act responsibly-i.e., to act in
the light of reasonable anticipations. To the extent that he does so, his actions are
responsible in a broader sense also. Where enterprise is free and enterprisers act
responsibly in their own interests, they are led by market disciplines to serve the
social interest as well. For our purposes, we need not spell out why this is so, since
discussions of the modern corporation invariably assume that individual enterprise
has this desirable characteristic. What such discussions question is the relevance of
this analysis to the large corporation, with its separation of ownership from control.
It is not only the corporate form of organization, however, which creates problems
concerning separation of the elements of enterprise. Such problems arise as soon
as the enterprise makes use of employees. Basic rules of agency law deal with these
problems and are best understood, it seems to me, as efforts to prevent such separation of risk, control, and profit as would jeopardize responsible management. The
rule respondeat superior, always difficult to justify on ordinary tort principles, is
understandable as an effort to place the risks of the enterprise upon the enterprise, to
require the enterpriser to weigh such risks in making his business calculations.
Similarly, the liability of the undisclosed principal, which is hard to explain on contract principles, represents an effort to assure responsibility in the decisions made by
the owner of a business, to make it impossible for the owner to hide behind an
irresponsible agent. This explanation applies also to the common-law liability of
secret partners. Furthermore, the rules establishing agents' fiduciary duties and disabilities represent attempts to promote responsible action by agents in the interest of
their principals. Again, the rule that agency powers are ordinarily revocable, even
when stated to be irrevocable, represents another striking effort to check the irresponsible action which might result from irrevocable separation of risk and control.
This interpretation explains also the exception to this rule in the case of powers
coupled with an interest or powers given as security. The exception permits one who
thus participates in the risks of the enterprise to be given irrevocably a share in its
control.
These rules reflect concern lest responsible management be jeopardized by
arrangements separating risk, control, and profit. They leave great freedom, however,
for the allocation of these elements. For example, one who lends money or sells
goods to a partnership may agree to look solely to partnership assets, thus assuming
a share of the enterprise risk. A lender may agree to take a share of the profits in
lieu of interest, or an employee may do so in lieu of fixed salary. They thus become
participants in both the profits and the risks of the enterprise, but without sharing
the liability of partners. The variety of these voluntary arrangements for sharing
risk, control, and profit is enormous. As already indicated, a primary function of
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the law of business organization is the setting of limits to the possible variations.
When the corporate form of organization is made available by statute, the principal
legislative question is whether there are special threats to irresponsibility inherent
in the corporate form which require special restraints on the freedom to allocate
risk, control, and profit. "Philosophies" of corporate statutes reflect divergent
answers to this question. Some of these theories will first be stated briefly; in the
next part, representative statutory provisions will be examined to ascertain the
relative influence of the various theories; and then we should be in a position to
consider whether there is a dominant philosophy of the "new look."
i. The first contemporary theory which I shall consider is the theory that a
corporation statute should be merely an "enabling act." Under this theory, the
privilege of incorporation with "limited liability" should be made freely available,
and promoters should have freedom in defining the scope of the enterprise and in
allocating risk, control, and profit through the corporation's security structure. This
theory prescribes also that relatively unhampered procedures should be available to
meet changing conditions by effecting changes in corporate purposes and security
structures.

No special conditions on the use of the corporate form are deemed necessary.
This theory implies that decisions for commitment of funds are the individual
responsibility of the investor or lender, protected, however, by the law of deceitAdherence to the agreed allocation of risks is deemed adequately assured by the
rules of contracts and fraudulent conveyances; management loyalty is adequately,
promoted by the rules concerning fiduciary duties and disabilities. This theory reflects also a skepticism as to the effectiveness of protective devices suggested by

alternative theories. It is feared also that incomplete legislative protections may result
in relaxation of individual efforts at self-protection, efforts which are deemed indispensable if investment decisions are to be responsibly made.
Advocates of the "enabling act" theory reject the notion that a corporation statute
should deal with the problem of possible monopoly. This theory, therefore, calls'
for no limitations of size, duration, purposes, or general powers.2
The "enabling act" theory does not mean that an adequate corporation statute can;
be simple and brief. To serve effectively as an enabling act, it must make its grants
of power and its authorized procedures sufficiently detailed to minimize doubts,.
including doubts which might arise from previous statutes and their judicial interpretation.
2. The second theory, like the first, is grounded on the premise that the social
interest is best served through responsible individual decisions in the furtherance of
individual interests. The second, however, reflects a belief that for corporate organization, the basic common-law doctrines of contracts, torts, and agency are inadequate to assure responsible individual decision, that these doctrines should be elab2
Recent corporation statutes show almost no traces of the general restrictive theory of which the dassicar
statement is the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933)-

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

orated and supplemented at various points to make it less likely that agreements as
to division of risk, control, and profit may be inadvisedly made or ineffectually
implemented.
For example, to provide a setting for responsible individual decision, a corpora.
don statute may include detailed provisions as to the relative rights of creditors and
shareholders, and of holders of different classes of shares-provisions which leave
the parties free to determine these rights, but which formalize the way in which
the determination must be made and which provide rules applicable in the absence
of contrary determination by the parties. A statute drawn on this theory might
spell out the application of the law of deceit in the corporation setting. It might
go further and relieve lenders and investors of the burden of asking the appropriate
questions, creating affirmative duties of disclosure in order to make it more probable
that decisions as to commitment of funds, exercise of voting rights, etc. will be responsibly made. Such a statute might also codify other general rules in their
particular application to corporate organization, such as the rules prescribing fiduciary
standards of loyalty and prohibiting transfers in fraud of creditors. In such codification, the rules might be strengthened to block evasion opportunities peculiar to the
corporate situation. In short, the second theory still looks to individual decisions
made with responsibility, but it advocates the creation of a statutory setting fostering
such responsibility.
3. The third theory prescribes a more drastic remedy, lest risks be inadvertently
assumed and powers inadvisedly exercised. It prescribes restrictions on the freedom
of the parties to allocate risk, control, and profit by contract. It conceives the task
of the legislature as including that of identifying particular types of allocation
which are deemed to jeopardize responsible investment and management. For
example, the statutes might outlaw nonvoting stock, prescribe a specified margin
of safety for creditors, or require more than a simple majority vote for various
corporate readjustments.
A point should be added which is applicable to both the second and third
theories. Their purpose in attempting to check irresponsible enterprise may be not
only to protect the investors and creditors directly involved, but also to reduce the
likelihood of financial catastrophes which might destroy the climate of reasonable
confidence which business enterprise requires
But whichever may be the dominant motive, the statutes are designed to promote responsible decisions in the
interests of investors and creditors. Since the third theory attempts to do this by
limiting the area of permissible arrangements, it may fairly be called a "paternal
responsibility" theory.
4. The fourth theory is a theory of "social responsibility." Its adherents disparage
the foregoing theories as all but irrelevant to the large corporation with its wide
dispersion of ownership among inactive stockholders. It is asserted that manage' Examples of this theme can be found in the writings of Jerome N. Frank and William 0. Douglas.
See dissenting opinion of Commissioner Frank in In the Matter of The North American Company, 4
S.E.C. 434, 462 (1939); WILLIAM 0. DouGLAs, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE (1940).
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ment neither can nor should be made wholly responsible to stockholders. Absentee
owners who have abdicated control have no ethical basis for a claim that the
enterprise be conducted to maximize their return. Furthermore, in many industries,
so large a fraction of the business is said to be concentrated in a few large corporations that consumers are inadequately protected by market competition. Similarly,
where a single plant employs a large fraction of the labor force of the locality, it is
argued that alternate employment opportunities furnish inadequate protection against
management decisions to reduce operations or to relocate. It is urged that corporate
managers should be under no obligation to maximize profit, but should have a wider
responsibility; that they should exercise corporate powers in the interest not only of
shareholders, but also of employees, customers, and the "general public." While
this theory has been much discussed by philosophers of corporation law, it has
almost no reflection in the actual statutes. The one exception is the wide adoption
of provisions authorizing corporate gifts to charity. Professor Berle considers the
charitable-gift statutes as showing the direction of a "20th Century Capitalist Revolution."4 We shall consider other statutory changes which a "social responsibility"
theory might support after we have reviewed the way in which midcentury statutes
deal with a representative group of problems and after we have attempted to measure
the influence of the first three theories.
II
x.Creditors' margin of safety
Nineteenth-century corporation statutes embodied in various ways the concept
of a capital fund, or margin of safety, for creditors as a substitute for the personal
liability of shareholders. The amount of the margin was the par value of the shares
issued. The margin requirement was implemented, in varying degrees of effectiveness, by provisions making subscribers liable for the full amount of the par value and
protecting this "capital" against impairment through dividends or purchase of outstanding shares. Some of the statutes prescribed a maximum ratio of debt to stock
investment, but these provisions were gradually eliminated and the amount of the
creditors' margin left to the will of the incorporators, except for a purely nominal
flat minimum. American statutes were, thus, similar to the British Companies Act
which W. S. Gilbert lampooned in Utopia, Ltd. According to Gilbert, the statute
required of incorporators nothing more than "a public declaration to what extent
they mean to pay their debts."
The American statutes often left serious gaps in the implementation of the
margin-of-safety concept. There were sometimes no teeth in the requirement that
the capital be paid in, and provisions as to maintenance of capital were commonly
incomplete. Of more importance, there were often provisions authorizing reduction
of capital without any restriction for protection of existing creditors such as the
British requirement of court approval. Authorization of no-par value shares intro'ADOLF
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•duced further complexities and doubts. While most of the statutes probably left some
place for "stock-watering" liability on no-par value shares, it was doubtful whether
the shareholders were required to underwrite the valuation of the entire consideration
for their shares or only the portion labeled "stated capital," excluding any amount
allocated to "paid-in surplus." This became an important question as to par value
shares also with the advent of the current practice of issuing shares with an arbitrarily
low par value and a large paid-in surplus.
Following the Model Act as revised in 1955,' several recent statutes have cleared
up the confusion as to paid-in surplus. This has been accomplished by requiring
that the consideration for shares, whether par or no-par value, shall be fixed in dollars
and by imposing shareholders' liability in terms not of par or stated value, but of the
full consideration fixed for the shares (subject to good faith valuation of property
transferred in payment). The same statutes, however, often leave creditors without
protection against distributions in "partial liquidation," even to the extent of the
-stated capital.6 The extension or clarification of stock-watering liability in these
statutes cannot, therefore, be interpreted as an implementation of the margin-of-safety
notion, but merely as an effort to check the obtaining of credit through an intentionally misleading balance sheet.
As already suggested, twentieth-century statutes have often permitted formal
reduction of capital without protection of existing creditors. Several recent statutes,
following the Model Act, have abolished even the necessity of formal reduction
and have authorized dividends out of stated capital in partial liquidation if the
articles so provide or if shareholder vote is secured.i The limit to such distribution
is reached only at the point of insolvency, which is usually defined in recent statutes
as an inability to pay debts as they mature in the usual course of business.
Some of the recent statutes, however, retain and revitalize the margin-of-safety
concept. Thus, neither Texas nor North Carolina authorizes distributions directly
"out of" stated capital, and both put restraints upon distribution of surplus created
by reduction of stated capital. Texas dramatically departs from the Model Act
by providing that distributions of reduction surplus shall make directors liable to
creditors existing at the time of the reduction in the event of later insolvency North
Carolina requires that any distribution of capital surplus (including reduction
surplus) must leave assets at least twice the amount of the debts? Both of these
statutes appear designed to block distributions which would subject creditors to risks
which they might not reasonably anticipate. The Texas provision establishes a limit
to creditors' risks in terms of stated capital, but the stated capital may be fixed at an
rMODEL BUSINESS CORPORA'TION ACT H§ 17, 23. The Model Act has been published as Cosanbrran
The
o,N CORPORATE IAws, AMERICAm BAR AssociATIoN, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION Aer (1953).
x955 revisions and optional sections appear in a supplemental leaflet. Id., REVISIONS AND OPTIONAL
SECTIONS (195.5).
Cf. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 41.

ibid.
'Ex. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 2.4rA(6) (1956).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(e)(3) (Supp. 1955).
8
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arbitrary minimum.

The North Carolina provision cannot be reduced to nominal

effect, since it covers not only stated capital, but also capital surplus; the margin
originally fixed may be reduced, however, so long as there remains a margin of ioo
per cent over debts. None of the statutes contains any substantial requirement of
original junior investment.

In this field, therefore, none of the statutes reflects the "paternal responsibility"
theory, as do the Public Utility Holding Company Act and chapter ten of the Bankruptcy Act, with their control of debt-equity ratios.'"

What the recent statutes do,

in varying degrees, is to protect a margin once established or purported to have
been established.

They thus illustrate my second theory, clarifying the original

agreement or representation as to risk and providing relief by adapting general
principles of contracts or deceit. But since most of the statutes take few steps in
this direction, they illustrate basically the first or "enabling act" theory, leaving it to
creditors to make their own bargains for the limitation of their risk. As a result,
elaborate covenants restricting dividends and other distributions and share purchases
are now common features not only of bond and debenture indentures, but also of
other types of agreements for extension of credit.
Promotion and security flotation
Apart from statute, courts have imposed upon corporate promoters duties beyond
those established by the common law of deceit. Promoters have been held to be
fiduciaries subject to an affirmative duty of disclosure, for breach of which the
corporation may, in certain situations, recover. But it has been open to the promoter to avoid this result by having all the shares issued initially to himself, with
sales to the public made by him rather than by the corporation. In this situation,
the promoter is free from common-law liability, unless his conduct amounted to
deceit. It is usually not difficult to arrange the promotion transactions in the
form which thus minimizes risk of liability.
The recent North Carolina statute is unique in closing this loophole. It includes
within its definition of "watered shares" (which are made subject to cancellation or
assessment) all shares issued to promoters for overvalued property which unfairly
dilute the holdings of other shareholders to whom adequate disclosure has not
been made.'1 Thus, in North Carolina, corporation lawyers can no longer defeat
the requirement of disclosure by mere technical arrangement of promotion transactions.
Draftsmen of other corporation statutes have ignored this problem, perhaps because the separate securities acts or "blue sky" laws provide statutory remedies for
purchasers of stock. While these statutes are beyond the scope of this symposium,
one point may be noted as to how they illustrate the general theories considered in
this paper. This is the familiar contrast between the Federal Securities Act of 1933
2.

1049 STAT. 815 (935),

15 U.S.C. §

799

(1952).
'N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 55-53 (Supp. r955).

(1952); 52 STAT. 895,

897 (W938),

i U.S.C. §§ 616, 62!
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and the typical state securities law. The federal act, like the North Carolina promoters' profit provision, is a disclosure act; it thus illustrates my second theory,
supplementing and reinforcing the law of deceit in order to promote responsible investment. The state securities acts, on the other hand, usually vest in their administrators discretionary power to halt the sale of securities which are deemed to be
"inequitable" or which would "tend to work a fraud." For example, under these
statutes, maximum selling commissions are often established and particular types of
financing arrangements are forbidden. Such provisions illustrate, or course, my third,
or "paternal responsibility," theory. Even the SEC, furthermore, exercises influence
on the terms of security flotations not only through its disclosure recuirements, but
also by conditioning the exercise of its discretionary power to accelerate registration upon compliance with certain approved standards.' 2
3. Fiduciaryduties and their enforcement

Application to corporate officers and directors of the agency standards of fiduciary
loyalty has generally been accomplished without the aid of statute. Legislation in
this field, however, has been on the increase. A few of the statutory provisions have
tightened fiduciary standards. Several recent statutes have flatly forbidden all loans
to officers and directors. A few have facilitated derivative suits by subjecting nonresident directors to jurisdiction on constructive service. In general, however, there
has been little effort in state legislation to keep corporate fiduciaries away from
temptation. State legislatures have not followed the federal lead with devices like
the recapture of profits from "short-swing" stock trading"3 or in extending fiduciary
duties to dealings with individual shareholders.' 4 Some of the recent statutes may
have actually reduced the force of the common-law rules. For example, many
state courts have declared that transactions authorized through the vote of a
director adversely interested are voidable regardless of fairness. The North Carolina
statute, however, provides that a transaction shall not be set aside if proved to have
been "just and reasonable to the corporation" at the time it was approved. " Several
recent statutes, furthermore, authorize the fixing of executive compensation without
a disinterested majority in the board and without shareholder ratification. There
have been several provisions authorizing stock option plans for executives. Some
of these have followed the Model Act optional provision which requires approval
by shareholders.'
With respect to enforcement of fiduciary duties through shareholders' derivative
suits, recent statutes are primarily concerned with the "strike suit" problem. They
continue the trend toward the rule disqualifying plaintiffs who were not shareholders at the time of the alleged wrong. The recent statutes typically authorize
"Note to SEC Rule 460, Securities Act Release No. 3791, May 28, 1957.
" Cf. Securities Exchange Act of r934, § 16(b), 48 STAr. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
14 Cf. SEC Rule X-IoB-5,

"=N.C. GEN.
"t

STAT.

17 C.F.R. § 24o-io6-5 (1949).

§ 55-30(b)(3) (Supp. 1955).
§ I8A.

Cf. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT

(1952).
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indemnification of defendant directors for litigation expenses in cases where the

litigation is settled as well as where defendants are judicially exonerated. Most of
these provisions follow the Model Act in rejecting both the California requirement
of court approval and the New York requirement of reporting to shareholders.' 7 The
North Carolina statute, however, does require court approval."
A few of the recent statutes include provisions for posting by shareholder-plaintiffs
of security for litigation expenses of defendants. Wisconsin gives defendants a right
to such security from plaintiffs holding less than three per cent of the shares of any
class. 9 North Dakota enacts the Model Act optional provision under which no
security may be required of plaintiffs whose holdings exceed $25,ooo in market

valueY ° A companion provision authorizes the court, at the end of any derivative
suit, to require plaintiffs to pay defendants' expenses if the court finds that the
action was brought without reasonable cause.'
On balance, the recent legislation concerning fiduciary duties illustrates the
"enabling act" theory, since its major concern has been lest application of commonlaw doctrines should be unduly restrictive of corporate management.
4. Election of directors
Most American statutes have not regulated the allocation of voting rights as a
means of promoting management responsibility to those bearing the ultimate risk.
To be sure, provisions for removal of directors, with or without cause, are increasingly common. Removal action, however, can be taken only by shareholders
with voting rights, and all of the recent statutes permit denial of voting rights to
any class or classes of shares. The statutes have no general requirement of "equitable" distribution of voting power like those of the Holding Company Act and
Nonvoting common shares are permissible,
chapter ten of the Bankruptcy Act 2
and exclusive voting control may thus apparently be vested in a small, closely-held
class of "management shares" representing only nominal investment. Furthermore,
express authorization of voting trusts is now customary, usually limited to ten years'
duration, but without time limit under the Wisconsin statute 3 The importance of
the statutory freedom to separate risk and voting control is somewhat reduced, however, by the fact that the New York Stock Exchange refuses to list nonvoting common shares. Mandatory cumulative voting to permit minority representation is provided in the Ohio24 and North Carolina2 5 statutes and in the original Model
Act 2
These statutes reflect a belief that, on balance, responsible management is
'1 Cf. id. § 4(0).

But see CAL. CORP. CODE § 830; N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 63.

GEN. STAT. § 55-21 (a) (2) (Supp. 1955).
" WIs. STAT. § 180.405(4) (1955)'°N.D. Laws 1957, C. 102, § 44; Cf. MODEL BUsINESs CORPORATION ACT § 43A.
'N.C.

2" bid.

22Cf. note 1o supra.
23 ,VIs. STAT. § 180.27 (1955).
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.55 (Page Supp. 1956).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55- 6 7(c) (Supp. 1955).
"

"MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 31.
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promoted by providing this channel of criticism, notwithstanding the dangers of
dissension within the board. Most of the states following the Model Act have chosen
the alternative provision for permissive cumulative voting

7

Massachusetts, however,

has recently repealed its permissive provision and now has no authorization.2 8
5. Preferredshares

"... preferred stockholders are not-like sailors or idiots or infants-wards of the
judiciary."' This dictum of Judge Frank was pronounced in a case involving "noncumulative" preferred stock. Paraphrasing Gertrude Stein, he insisted: "... . a con-

tract is a contract is a contract.""0 To what extent, we may ask, do preferred stock
provisions of midcentury corporation statutes reflect a similar philosophy? To what
extent, on the other hand, have preferred stockholders become wards of the legislature? The North Carolina statute has gone farthest in the latter direction. I shall
summarize the principal provisions which support this statement and indicate
some of the contrasts afforded by other statutes.
Before this is done, however, it should be noted that the North Carolina statute
has also some unique provisions designed to obviate troublesome problems of interpretation without limiting contractual freedom. It is provided that preferred
shareholders are excluded from participating beyond their stated preferences (dividend and liquidation), unless the language clearly indicates the contrary. Similarly,
the amount of any dividend arrearage is to be added to the stated liquidation preference, unless this result is clearly inconsistent with the charter wording3 1
None of the state statutes approaches the kind of standardization of preferredstock provisions and regulation of capital structures which the Securities & Exchange
Commission has developed under the Public Utility Holding Company Act. No state
requires, as do these SEC regulations, that holders of preferred stock be empowered
to elect a majority of the directors when dividends are in arrears; nor do the state
statutes regulate the ratio of preferred to common stock investment. 2 The North
Carolina statute, however, does provide that, regardless of charter language, noncumulative preferred shareholders shall be entitled to a "dividend credit" to the
extent that their dividends are earned but not declared in any year. 33
Another unique provision of this statute enables preferred shareholders to protect
themselves against distributions of capital surplus to common shareholders in partial
liquidation. Such a distribution requires a majority vote of each class.3 4 (There is
no corresponding restriction, however, on the use of the same funds to purchase
common shares.) The statute also contains a general prohibition of dividends and
Cf. id. alternative § 31.
" Mass. Laws 1956, c. 375.
2 Guttmann v. Illinois Central R. Co., 189 F.2d 927, 930 (2d Cir. 1951).
20
Ibid.
27

8

'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55- 4 0(b) (Supp. 1955).
2Cf. 49 SrAT. 815 (1935),
15 U.S.C. § 799 (1952).

Act Release No. 13106, Feb. 16, 1956.

" N.C. GEN. STAT. §
"'ld.§ 55-50()(1).

55-40(C) (Supp. 1955).

See also Public Utilities Holding Company

PHILOSOPHY

purchases of shares if the action would reduce net assets to an amount below the
aggregate liquidation preferences of preferred shareholders3 5
Contemporary statutes deal in increasing detail with changes in the position of
preferred shareholders through charter amendment, merger, etc. They typically
contain express authority for cancellation of arrearages but require approval by preferred shareholders voting as a class, even if the class has no voting rights in
elections of directors. Following Delaware, North Carolina requires only a simple
majority of the class,30 while the Model Act requires two-thirds3 ' The North Carolina statute adds a caveat: "No inference shall be drawn from the broad power of
amendment conferred by this chapter that an exercise of that power in a particular
case is fair and equitable."3' Contrary to the Model Act, appraisal rights are given
to dissenting preferred shareholders in certain cases of charter amendment as well
as merger;39 and an appraisal floor is set at two-thirds of the liquidation preference
if junior shares participate in the plan without contribution.4 °
The North Carolina draftsmen removed one of the sources of the pressure sometimes exerted upon preferred shareholders to agree to a reduction of their rights.
In states where dividends out of current earnings are forbidden when capital is impaired, payment of preferred dividends may require a reduction of capital, which
common shareholders are in a position to block. The North Carolina statute not only
permits payment of preferred dividends out of current profits when capital is
impaired, but also makes this provision override any charter limitation to the
contrary. 4' Purchases of preferred shares at prices depressed by suspension of
dividends are somewhat restricted by the requirement of prior notice of intention
to make such purchases# 2 Under the Texas statute, no shares may be purchased
when dividends are in arrears.43
Most of the recent statutes have no similar provisions restricting the allocation
of risk, control, and profit among holders of various classes of shares. They leave
it to investors in preferred shares (as they do to creditors) to bargain out acceptable
protective provisions.
III
The foregoing summary makes clear that the recent statutes reflect, in general,
an "enabling act" theory, more or less modified by the theory that corporation
statutes, while assuring freedom of contract, should reinforce in various ways the
responsibility of individual decisions; and the theory that freedom of the parties
should be limited in order that the results of responsible freedom may more nearly
Id. § 55-50(c)(3).
0
' 1d. §

55-100(b)(3); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (I953).
" MODEL BUsINEss CORPOAMON ACr § 54(c).
18
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-99(a) (Supp. 1955).
SId. § 55-101(b). But cf. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION Acr
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(e) (Supp. 1955).
1

' 1ld. § 55"5o(b).
"I1d. § 55-52(f).

"' Tax.

Bus. CoRP. Aar art. 2.03C (r956).

§§ 71, 74.
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be approximated. Only the North Carolina statute has gone very far in applying
these latter theories; it thus has a kind of "new look" which is conspicuous in the
parade of new statutes.
Apart from this almost unique design, what is there in the other recent
statutes, particularly those patterned after the Model Act, which justifies the term
"new look"? It is sometimes suggested that the novelty of design is to be appreciated by contrasting the Delaware General Corporation Law. A principal draftsman of the Model Act reported the opinion of the American Bar Association Committee that the Delaware Act is"
poor in sequence and loose in its provisions ....
[It] bids for the corporate business of
promoters. It makes little or no effort to protect the rights of investors. Hence, in the
opinion of the committee, it was not the type of statute which the committee should
present as a model .... The model act makes use of only one provision of the Delaware
statute and that is the provision empowering corporations to indemnify their directors....
This quotation seems to me to exaggerate the differences in substance between
the Delaware and Model acts. The examples of "loose" Delaware provisions cited
in this article are those permitting charter amendment by simple majority and permitting dividends from current earnings notwithstanding a capital deficit." Neither
of these features seems conspicuously "loose"; both are incorporated in the new
North Carolina statute,4" the draftsmen of which were certainly solicitous of the interests of investors. There are, of course, other provisions of the Delaware statute
which are open to criticism, such as the authorization of dividends out of capital
47
surplus with no requirement that the source be identified.
The most important contrast between the Delaware and Model acts is that indicated by the statement that the Delaware statute is "poor in sequence." At the
time the Model Act was prepared, the Delaware Act was exceedingly difficult to use
because of its lack of convenient arrangement and its long, involved sentences.
In the revised Delaware Code of 1953, the General Corporation Law was improved
by breaking up and rearrangement of sections, but unwieldy sentence structure still
predominates. The Model Act has, indeed, a new look: it is vastly easier on the
eyes. (Some of my friends out here in the provinces say that it's the difference
between Chicago and New York styles of corporate draftsmanship.)
IV
We have seen that a more or less unmodified "enabling act" philosophy is dominant in most of the recent corporation statutes, as it is in the Delaware statute. It is
a curious fact, however, that this philosophy is seldom articulated and almost never
defended with confident vigor. Its objective-responsible management in the inter"

Campbell, The Model Business Corporation Act, Business Lawyer, July 1956, pp. 98,
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242, 170 (1953).

"DEL.

" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-101, 55-50 (Supp. 1955).

"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 0953).

xoo-ox.

PHILOSOPHY

ests of shareholders-has been under attack for over a generation. The attack has
come from many sources-from social philosophers and theologians, from economists
and law teachers and business executives.
This movement began with Thorstein Veblen, who caustically depicted the modern corporation, with its inactive stockholders, as a prime example of "absentee
ownership."4 Of greater importance, perhaps, were the pronouncements of corporation executives in the twenties, heralding a new orientation of management loyalty.
Henry Ford, in trying to defend his limited dividends against minority stockholder
attack, disclaimed any intention to maximize profits and proposed, instead, to reduce
prices for the benefit of car buyers and to create more jobs. While the Supreme Court
of Michigan flatly rejected this view of corporate purposes,49 other leading executives
espoused the same philosophy. Owen D. Young wrote that he considered himself
a trustee not merely for stockholders, but for the corporate "institution"--i.e., for
stockholders, employees, customers, and the general public. 0
In 1932, Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, in The Modern Corporation
and Private Property, gave strong support to this idea, and their work was widely
hailed as a contribution of outstanding importance. Tracing the extent of the separation of ownership from control in the modern corporation, they challenged the
ethical claim of the inactive investor to the residual profits of industry. They
declared that s '
it seems almost essential if the corporate system is to survive,--that the "control" of the
great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety
of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the
income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.
True, when Professor E. Merrick Dodd called for legal recognition of the new
principle of wider responsibility, Professor Berle suggested caution. 2 In rejoinder,
Dodd insisted that a principle of "vicarious acquisitiveness" has little ethical or emotional appeal either to managers or to the general public. For Dodd, the principle
of trusteeship for absentee investors presented a melancholy dilemma: "Abandon
it as yet, we dare not--enforce it with more than moderate success, it is to be feared
we cannot."0'
I have said that the "social responsibility" philosophy has had almost no influence
upon recent statutes. The one exception is the now popular authorization of corporate gifts to charity. Even before these statutes, of course, many types of donations
were defensible as means of creating consumer or employee goodwill. The recent
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statutes, however, cover much broader ground. The pressure for corporate giving
was a result of tax laws which made it increasingly difficult to finance charities
through individual gifts. Congress was induced to provide a limited tax deduction
for corporate donations. ' One cannot dismiss the state statutes, however, as merely
dealing with a tax problem. They do represent a limited acceptance of the social
responsibility theory, as the New Jersey court recognized in the leading case.3 Many
of the recent statutes, furthermore, have set no limits upon corporate gifts, either in
terms of amount or of shareholder approval. Ohio has recently repealed its previous limitations. 56
As already noted, Professor Berle considers that these statutes are signs of a
corporate revolution. Magnanimously, he now concedes victory to Professor Dodd
7
in their 1932 controversy over "To Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees ?"5
I find it hard to believe that the charitable-gift statutes and practices will prove to be
forerunners of a major change. Under the traditional view, risk-taking investment
is typically made in the hope not only of cash dividends, but also of appreciation
reflected in stock prices and often "realized" through stock dividends and splits with
gradually increasing total cash distributions. I see no reason to think that this
concept of common stock is soon to be replaced by a concept under which the
expectation of stockholders will be limited, like that of holders of perpetual debentures, with no claim upon residual profits. Corporate giving may increase, but it
is unlikely that whatever profits are left after "reasonable dividends" will come to
be regarded as at the disposal of the directors in accordance with their views of
public welfare.
Apart from these provisions for charitable contributions, the new concept of
social responsibility has had almost no elaboration. It is not merely that the theory
has had no further influence on the actual statutes, but in a quarter of a century,
neither the originators of this philosophy nor their disciples have sketched with any
detail or persuasiveness the lines of possible practical application. And the few suggestions which have been made justify skepticism as to the seminal quality of the
new theory.
In 1954, George Goyder, an English businessman, published The Future of
Private Enterprise-A Study in Responsibility. In his view,"8
The weakness of Company Law at present is that the directors are without legal
guidance as to their responsibilities to the workers, the consumers or the community....
What is wanted is a General Objects Clause, declaring management responsibility for
"fair and reasonable prices," "regular dividends," "stable employment under good conditions so far as possible," etc. Once defined, the legal responsibilities ... of the directors,
can be made actionable in a court of law, . ..
"
"
"
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Nothing could be simpler; but the history of utility regulation and of emergency
price and wage controls is soberingly relevant. To say the least, standards of "fair"

prices and wages are hard to come by, and few lawyers can be optimistic about
the litigation process as a mode of developing such standards.
More cautious is the approach of Howard R. Bowen in Social Responsibility of
the Businessman, part of a study commissioned by the Federal Council of Churches
and published in 1953. Dr. Bowen endorses the "social responsibility" concept, but,
as an economist, he recognizes that businessmen5"
are often not in a good position to know how they can best serve society, and their
They need
decisions based on the service motive may often hit wide of the target....
short-cut methods of reaching decisions that do not involve all the complexities of relating
every individual action to the social interest. The price system provides that short-cut
method. With all its imperfections, it is a marvelous device for registering social valuations and thus providing a system of easily recognizable signals by which individuals can
reconcile their own self-interest and the social interest. . . . [Thus, the businessman
should] rely primarily on profit as his guide. . . [He should depart from this guide
only when it leads him toward] restrictive monopoly, exploitation, fraud, misrepresentation, political bribery, waste of natural resources, economic insecurity, etc.
Here, again, these terms offer little guidance to the conscientious director (except
as to misrepresentation and other conduct forbidden by law).
In general, one may question the extent to which socially responsible deliberation
would actually lead management to decisions different from those indicated by
long-range profit considerations. For example, concern for employee goodwill
might well cause management to seek ways to cushion the effects of production
cut-backs, automation, plant relocation, etc. If advocates of "social responsibility"
would have management go much farther in maintaining unprofitable operations,
it is by no means clear that such action would be socially responsible. And with
respect to price policy, however seriously management might regard its social responsibility, perhaps the influences operating to further the social interest would
still be principally those resulting from competition among products and producers
for consumers' spending ° In any event, management must be concerned with
the extent to which the new concept of corporate responsibility may influence behavior of consumers or employees. If public opinion comes to expect corporations
to assume some new responsibility, this is a fact which profit-conscious management
can not ignore.
Another "reform" proposed in the name of social responsibility is the abolition
of shareholder voting rights. This is a measure advocated by Peter F. Drucker
after a period as official philosopher-in-residence at General Motors. According to
Drucker, "there is absolutely nothing in the nature of investment that either requires or justifies ownership rights, that is rights of control"; voting power should
Spp. 144, 146.
any event, one would not be unduly skeptical of moral restraints if he hesitated to follow
social responsibility enthusiasts when they urge radical relaxation of antitrust laws. See DAviD E. LILIENTHAL, BIG BUSINESS: A Naw ERA (1953).
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be "vested in perpetuity in the Board of Directors," who would elect to their number
"representatives" of investors, management, and the "plant community." 1 Drucker
regards this as merely legalizing the disfranchisement already existing in fact. Criticizing this position, Lloyd K. Garrison expressed belief that0 2
upon close examination it will be found that even in the case of the great corporations
whose securities are widely distributed and largely voted by management proxies, effective
control over many basic policy decisions is lodged in some stockholder group-perhaps
in a very small minority, but in an effective one; . . .
Drucker brushes aside or disapproves not only the influence of particular stockholders, but also the general influence arising from the possibility of organized
opposition. But after recent examples of proxy warfare, it would be rash to assert
that these possibilities exert no wholesome stimulus or restraint upon management.
When poor management is reflected in reduced earnings, the resulting decline in
stock prices may create attractive opportunities to accumulate shares in a bid for
control. To be sure, the stock market is not an ideal mechanism for the discipline
of management. But, whatever may be the dangers from corporation "raiders," it
is at least doubtful that management responsibility would be improved by making
it impossible to acquire working control through purchases of stock.0 3
The vitality of the "social responsibility" theory is not to be measured by the
limited enthusiasm which these typical proposals have engendered. The theory is
important as a perennial insistence that there just must be some new way of disciplining corporate profit-seeking. Expressing his disappointment with Bowen's
report, the Rev. F. Ernest Johnson asked almost wearily "Is it not possible to devise
instruments of a more authentic corporate responsibility?"4 But the prospect of a
break-through on this front is not encouraging, for what is demanded is a contrivance which would operate neither through individual responsibility and competitive markets nor through political controls.
The new philosophy has thus far succeeded in producing only an unresolved
discontent with existing corporation law. It has obscured the values served by the
older philosophies and the fact that these philosophies also can lay claim to the
"social responsibility" label. Perhaps corporation law critics should keep straining to
catch Professor Berle's vision of "The Modern Corporation and the City of God.""
But in the meantime, we need not be defensive about the statutes of North Carolina
and Texas--or even those of Illinois and Delaware. None of them, to be sure, is a
model ordinance for the City of God. But the corporate organizations they make
possible are institutions not inappropriate for economic activity in the Earthly City.
6
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